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NOTES
Statutes of Limitations and Defendant Class Actions
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a civil action
is commenced1 in federal court by the filing of a complaint. 2 In

cases arising under federal law, this has been interpreted to mean
that filing tolls the applicable statute of limitations.3 Ordinarily,
filing tolls the statute only as to parties named in the complaint4 and
new parties must be added by amending the complaint before the
statute expires.5
Complaints initiating class actions in federal court under rule 23,
however, purposefully do not name all parties to the suit.6 Only
class representatives are specified, although all members of the class
are bound by the ultimate outcome.7 The Federal Rules do ,no_t indi1. Statutes of limitations define a limited period of time during which an action must be
brought. "Tolling" is some activity that suspends the running of the statute; when an action is
"co=enced," the statute is permanently tolled. See Recent Developments, Commencement
Rules and Tolling Statutes of Limitations in Federal Court: Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 66
CORNELL L. REV. 842, 842 n.2 (1981 ). See also Developments in the Law - Statutes ofLimitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1220-37 (1950).
2. FED. R. CN. P. 3.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285, 287 (6th Cir. 1978); Windbrooke Dev.
Corp. v. Environmental Enters., 524 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1975); Moore Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925
(1966); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140-41 (2d Cir.}, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947). In
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that state
provisions control tolling in diversity questions, and expressly reserved the question of tolling
in federal question jurisdiction, 446 U.S. at 751 & n.11. Nevertheless, subsequent courts and
co=entators have continued to assume that filing tolls the statute of limitations in federal
question suits. See, e.g., Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 495 F. Supp. 299, 303-04 & n.9
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Recent Developments, supra note I, at 854-56. This Note is concerned only
with suits arising under federal law.
4. Millerv. M'lntyre, 31 U.S. 57, 59, 6 Pet. 61, 63 (1832) ("Until the defendants were made
parties to the bill, the suit cannot be considered as having been co=enced against them.").
This rule is relaxed with respect to parties that the plaintiff seeks to add or substitute sharing
an "identity of interest" with the defendant originally named in the complaint. FED. R. CN. P.
15(c); see, e.g., Staren v. American Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir.
1976); Miller v. Cousins Properties, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 711, 714 (D. Vt. 1974); Annot., 8 A.L.R.
2d 6, 112-18, 144-48 (1949); Annot., II A.L.R. Fed. 269, 281-82 (1972).
5. California practice permits the plaintiff to substitute named parties for John Doe defendants after the statute has run. See generally Hogan, California's Unique Doe Defendant
Practice: A Fiction Stranger 'I7zan Truth, 30 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1977); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 3d 130
(1978). The federal courts have repeatedly rejected such a practice. See, e.g., Sassi v. Breier,
584 F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1978); Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir.
1977); Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1969); Molnar v. National Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 684, 686-87 (9th Cir. 1956).
6. FED. R. Cw. P. 23(a).
1. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (plaintiff class action); Smith v. Swormstedt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853) (plaintiff and defendant class action).
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cate when the statute of limitations is tolled as to absent, unnamed
members of the class. While rule 23 authorizes both plaintiff and
defendant class actions, 8 the question of tolling with respect to absent class members typically has arisen in plaintiff class actions.9 A
line of decisions beginning with American Pipe and Construction Co.
v. Utah 10 has evolved standards to determine when an absent plaintiff will be regarded as having commenced suit within the limitations
period. 11 No authoritative line of cases, though, has defined when
suit commences against an unnamed defendant, 12 and thus tolls the
8. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all . . . ." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a); see Thillens, Inc. v. Co=unity Currency Exch. Assn.,
97 F.R.D. 668, 673 (N.D. ill. 1983).
9. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp. 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 942 (1980); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane),
vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 940 (1980); Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349 (7th
Cir. 1975); Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975);
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Duran v. Credit Bureau, 93
F.R.D. 607 (D. Ariz. 1982); Weisman v. Darneille, 89 F.R.D. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Galloway v.
American Brands, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 580 (E.D.N.C. 1978); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Secs.
Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); cases cited at notes 11 & 65 infra.
10. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
II. See, e.g., Chardon v. Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983) (''tolling effect" - whether limitations period is suspended or renewed by tolling - is determined by state rules, unless inconsistent with federal law); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103 S. Ct. 2392 (1983) (statute tolls
upon filing of class action for opt-out plaintiffs pursuing separate suits as well as intervenors);
United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (intervention by absent member of purported class permitted after expiration of limitations period to appeal denial of class certification); McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (statute tolled for absent
members of class denied certification for failure to satisfy "typicality" requirement provided
that complaint fairly notified defendants of their claims); Haas v. Pittsburgh Natl. Bank, 526
F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (lack of proper representative plaintiff with respect to a particular
defendant did not undermine sufficiency of notice provided that defendant by complaint).
12. Defendant class actions are much less co=on than plaintiff class actions. See Note,
JJefendant Class Actions, 91 HAR.v. L. REV. 630, 630 (1978). An extensive list of cases involving defendant class actions is found in Wolfson, JJefendanl Class Actions, 38 Omo ST. L.J. 459,
459-60 n.4 (1977).
Although less numerous than plaintiff class actions, defendant class actions may have a
longer history. In the chancery courts of 17th and 18th century England, the bulk of class
actions and their early counterparts, bills of peace, were directed against classes of defendants.
Such actions typically sought to adjudicate the rights of the lord of the manor against his
tenants, the parson against his parishioners, or the creditor against members of a joint stock
enterprise. I H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1148, at 250 (1977).
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), approved the
use of defendant class actions in American courts, stating:
The rule is well-established, that where the parties interested are numerous, and the suit is
for an object co=on to them all, some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of
themselves and of the others; and a bill may also be maintained against a portion of a
numerous body of defendants, representing a co=on interest.
57 U.S. (16 How.) at 302. Authorization for defendant class actions was later embodied in the
Federal Rules of Equity: "When the question is one of co=on or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole." Fed. Equity R. 38 (1912), quoted in
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Ac/ion
Problem", 92 HAR.v. L. REv. 664, 669 n.24 (1979) (emphasis added).
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statute of limitations. 13
This Note argues that in defendant class actions the statute of
limitations should be tolled as to all named and absent class members upon informal notice given by the plaintiff at the beginning of
the suit. 14 Part I examines the purposes of statutes of limitations and
13. See Appleton Blee. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, 63S F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 4S1 U.S. 976 (1981) (''American Pipe, of course, is not dispositive of this case, for the
application of the tolling doctrine to a defendant class was not an issue there.").
Four courts have considered tolling in defendant class actions: Appleton Blee. Co. v.
Graves Truck Line, 63S F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 4S1 U.S. 976 (1981); Kerney v.
Fort Griffin Fandangle Assn., 624 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1980); Chevalier v. Baird Sav. Assn., 72
F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Bestline Prods. Secs. & Antitrust Litig., [1974-7S Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) f 95,070, at 97,750 (S.D. Fla. 197S).
14. Tolling questions may arise in defendant class actions in two situations. First, certification of the class may be denied. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l). The plaintiff might then attempt
to join or file independent suits against absent class members. If the statute of limitations has
expired, the absent defendants could plead the statute as barring any action against them, as
occurred in Bestline. Second, if a defendant class action is certified under rule 23(b)(3), members of the defendant class may choose to "opt out" after receiving notice of the suit. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(2). If the statute of limitations has run, defendants who opted out may then try to
plead the statute as a bar to any effort by the plaintiff to file independent suits against them, as
occurred in Appleton.
All class actions must be certified under one of three subclassifications of FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b). A class is certified under rule 23(b)(1) if separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent or varying results for different individual defendants, or if a plaintiff's successful suit
against a single defendant would be given substantial weight in subsequent actions against
other similarly situated defendants. A class is certified under rule 23(b)(2) when a plaintiff
seeks primarily injunctive or declaratory relief against a class of defendants who have acted on
generally similar grounds, or are engaged in similar practices. Finally, a class is certified under
rule 23(b)(3) in cases where a common question oflaw or fact predominates over individual
controversies and where the plaintiff can demonstrate the manageability and superiority of a
class action over other methods of adjudication. See generally 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 23.31-23.4S {2d ed. 1982); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§§ 1772-84 (1972).
Commentators have suggested that, since the opportunity to opt out of•a defendant class
could frustrate the purpose of a defendant class action by allowing the exclusion of a significant number of absent class members, defendant classes cannot appropriately be certified
under rule 23(b)(3). See I H. NEWBERG, supra note 12, § 1148c, at 254; Note, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 23: A .Defendant Class Action with a Public Official as the Named Representative,
9 VAL. L. REv. 357, 389-90 (197S). In practice, however, courts have frequently certified defendant classes under 23(b){3). See, e.g., Appleton Blee. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways,
494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan.
1968),mod!fted, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971) &404 U.S. 1063
(1972); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 28S F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
Interestingly, one court has suggested that defendant classes perhaps should not be certified under 23(b)(l) or (2), since the language of those sections literally applies only to plaintiff
classes. Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741, 746 (D. Mass. 1972); cf. Thompson v.
Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1983) (certification of defendant class under
(b)(2) appropriate only "in very limited circumstances"). Other courts, however, have not hesitated to certify defendant classes under these sections. See 3B J. MooRE & J. KENNEDY,
supra, f 23.40[6], at 23-310 to -311 ("[S]ince actions for injunctions or declaratory relief against
defendant class [sic] are useful devices, and because there seems to be no intent to assign them
exclusively to the standards of (b)(l) suits, some courts have stretched the (b)(2) language to
allow defendant classes." (footnote omitted)); Note, supra note 12, at 634 (1978) ("[G]iven the
clear authorization of defendant class actions in rule 23(a), the provisions of rule 23(b) should
be interpreted to encompass defendant classes where appropriate.").
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class actions, and the manner in which these purposes were reconciled inAmerican Pipe. It concludes that American Pipe requires the
creation of a tolling doctrine that promotes both the fair notice policy that underlies statutes of limitations and the concern for litigative
economy that underlies rule 23 class actions. Part II then demonstrates that courts thus far have been unsuccessful in adaptingAmerican Pipe to defendant class actions. Finally, Part III proposes a
requirement of informal notice at the outset of a defendant class action as a means of harmonizing defendants' need for notice with
plaintiffs' and courts' desire for efficiency.

I.

RECONCILING THE POLICIES UNDERLYING STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS AND CLASS ACTIONS - THE AMERICAN
PIPE RULE

The Supreme Court has stated: "Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants." 15 There are two
complementary aspects to this purpose - notice and repose. Timely
notice promotes fair adjudication of disputes by informing defendants of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses necessary to their
defense. 16 Expiration of the limitations period signifies the point at
which the defendant's expectation of repose begins to outweigh the
plaintifrs right to assert a claim. 17 Because limitations statutes afford plaintiffs only a reasonable period in which to bring suit, 18 they
encourage plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently. 19 The courts as
well as defendants benefit from these laws;20 they are spared the bur15. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). See Smith v. American
President Lines, 571 F.2d 102, 109 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978); Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317,
322 (3d Cir. 1976); Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1961), revd.
on other grounds, 307 F.2d 99 (1962); see generally Note, Statutes ofLimitations and Opting Out
of Class Actions, 81 MICH. L. REv. 399, 412-14 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944):
Statutes of limitation . . . promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is
unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation . . . .
quoted in Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
17. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487 (1980); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944) ("[T]he right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."), quoted in Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965); Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 829 (7th Cir.
1979).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. ll 1, ll7 (1979); Ehlers v. City of Decatur,
614 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1980).
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. California School of Professional Psychology, 583 F.2d 1099, ll0l
(9th Cir. 1978) (''The rationale for limitations periods is to encourage persons promptly to file
legal claims . . . ."); Dedmon v. Falls Prods. Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom,
J.) ("Its purpose is to force a litigant to get moving, and to get moving fast . . . .").
20. This benefit has been described as the "institutional" justification for statutes oflimita-
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den of adjudicating stale claims,21 and their credibility is enhanced
by improving the accuracy of fact:finding. 22
Class actions, on the other hand, have as their primary purpose
the promotion of litigative efficiency. They conserve judicial resources by preventing duplicative suits and motions stemming from
a single dispute.23
In overseeing the operation of statutes of limitations, courts must
devise tolling doctrines that are consistent with federal law.24 This
means that in class actions the tolling rule should preserve the efficiency goals of rule 23,25 without interfering with defendants' interests in notice and repose. 26
In American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 21 "the seminal
case on the application of the tolling doctrine in class action suits,"28
tions. Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights ofAction
and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1011, 1016-17 (1980).
21. See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("[T]he courts
ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his
rights." (footnote omitted)); United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956); Allen
v. United States, 542 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) ("Some statutes of limitations serve to protect the courts from the necessity for adjudicating stale claims."); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v.
United States, 312 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1963) (''The purpose of statutes of limitations is 'to
keep stale ligitation out of the courts.'" (citation omitted)); Sherwood v. Graco, Inc., 427 F.
Supp. 155, 157 (D. Colo. 1977); Special Project, supra note 20, at 1016-17.
22. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (''The process of
discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate facts for or against the plaintiff by
the judge or jury is obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively
fresh."); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Special Project, supra note 20, at
1017.
23. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103 S. Ct. 2392, 2395 (1983); American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556 (1974); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578
F.2d 987, 998 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 940 (1980); Note,
supra note 15, at 418.
24. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975) ("[C]onsiderations
of state law may be displaced where their application would be inconsistent with the federal
policy underlying the cause of action under consideration." (citation omitted)), quoted in
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980) and Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584, 590 (1978).
25. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103 S. Ct. 2392, 2395 (1983); American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553-54 (1974); cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
U.S. 454, 466 (1975) ("[In American Ppe] there was a substantial body of relevant federal
procedural law to guide the decision to toll the limitation period, and 'significant underlying
federal policy that would have conflicted with a decision not to suspend the running of the
statute.").
26. Cf. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23 advisory committee note on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39
F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966) ("Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action
would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, . . . without sacrificing procedural fairness . . . ."); notes 40-50 infra and accompanying text.
27. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
28. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, 635 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981) (defendant and plaintiff class action); see, e.g., Jefferson v. H.K.
Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356, 360 (N.D. Ala. 1980) ("Any analysis of the application of a
statute of limitations to members of a class in a class action lawsuit should begin withAmerican
Ppe . . • .") (plaintiff class action), ojfd, 648 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981 ).
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the Supreme Court announced a tolling rule for plaintiff class actions that harmonizes the purposes of rule 23 and statutes of limitations - filing a plaintiff class action tolls the statute for all members
of the class. The Court reasoned that unless the filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations for all potential class members,
they ''would be induced to file protective motions to intervene or to
join in the event that a class was later found unsuitable." 29 This
"needless duplication of motions"30 ''would deprive rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal
purpose of the procedure."31 Moreover, the Court observed, when
the complaint initiating a class action notifies defendants "not only
of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the
number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs," defendants
have the information essential to determine the scope of the prospective litigation within the limitations period, regardless of whether the
actual trial is ultimately conducted as a class action or in some other
form. 32 Hence, the rule ofAmerican Pipe, that the filing of a plaintiff
class action tolls the statute for all members of the purported class, is
consistent with the objectives of both rule 23 and statutes of
limitations.33
II.

FIITING AMERICAN PIPE TO DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS

This Part examines the three district and circuit court decisions
that have appliedAmerican Pipe to defendant class actions. It argues
that these opinions fail to recognize that American Pipe attributed
equal importance to notice and litigative efficiency, rather than subordinating one policy to the other. Finally, in support of adapting
American Pipe's balanced approach to defendant class actions, this
Part illustrates the negative effects that result from such
subordination.
A. The Cases

The American Pipe tolling doctrine was first applied to a defendant class action in In re Bestline Products Securities and Antitrust Litigation .34 As in American Pipe, class certification had been denied in
29. 414 U.S. at 553.
30. 414 U.S. at 554.
31. 414 U.S. at 553; see note 23 supra and accompanying texl
32. 414 U.S. at 555; see note 49 infra and accompanying text.
33. 414 U.S. at 555.
34. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED SEc. L. REP. (CCH) t 95,070, at 97,750 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
Only four cases have dealt with the problems presented by the statute of limitations in
defendant class actions. See note 13 supra • These cases may arise infrequently because most
defendant class actions seek injunctive or declaratory relief. See l H. NEWBERG, supra note 12,
§ 1148, at 251; Note, Personal Jurisdiction and Rule 23 .Defendant Class Actions, 53 IND, L.J.
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Bestline. In American Pipe, absent plaintiffs moved to intervene
under rule 24;35 in Best/ine, plaintiffs sought to join absent defendants under rule 20.36 Since both rules permit an additional party to
be named in suits involving common questions of law or fact, the
Bestline court analogized from the permissive intervention of individual plaintiffs from an unsuccessful plaintiff class to the permissive
joinder of individual defendants from an uncertified defendant
class.37 Based on this procedural similarity, the court concluded that
the holding and rationale of American Pipe applied to defendant
class actions,38 holding that the mere filing of a class action tolls the
statute of limitations with respect to individual defendants who
would have been members of the defendant class had the court certi-.
fled it.39
In relying simply on procedural similarity, however, the Bestline
court ignored the analysis by which the Supreme Court reached its
holding in American Pipe. Specifically, Bestline failed to consider
whether the tolling rule it applied furthered the goals of both rule 23
and limitations statutes in a defendant class context. As subsequent
decisions have recognized, if the statute is tolled merely by filing a
complaint in defendant class actions, absent members of the class
may not receive notice of the action within the statutory period,40
thus frustrating one of the major purposes of statutes of limitations.
By contrast, the court in Chevalier v. Baird Savings Association 41
focused on notice, holding that the statute continued· to run as to
unnamed members of the defendant class until each was named in
an amended complaint or until the class was certified.42 Although
the Chevalier court ensured that defendant class members would receive notice within the limitations period, it overlooked rule 23's in841, 844 (1978); Co=ent, .Damages in Class Actions: .Determination and A/location, IO B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 615,619 (1969);seea/so note 14supra.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) ("[A]nyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2)
when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
co=on.").
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) ("All persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if
there is asserted against them . . . any right to relief . . . arising out of the same transaction
. . . and if any question of law or fact co=on to all defendants will arise in the action.")
37. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,070, at 97,752.
38. See also Wolfson, supra note 12, at 471 ("Bringing a defendant class action undoubtedly satisfies the statute of limitations requirement of co=encing an action with respect to all
defendant class members, just as bringing a plaintiff class action tolls the statute with respect to
all absent plaintiff class members." (footnote omitted)).
39. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,070, at 97,752 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
40. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, 635 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981); Chevalier v. Baird Sav. Assn., 72 F.R.D. 140, 155 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
41. 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
42. 72 F.R.D. at 155.
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terest in litigative economy and efficiency, which was thwarted by its
requirement of joinder.
In the only Court of Appeals case to deal with tolling in defendant class actions, Appleton Electric Co. v. Graves Truck Lines,43 the
court reached the same result as the Bestline court, for different reasons. The Appleton court believed that it was confronted by "a true
conflict between the operation of the statute of limitations and Rule
23," and reasoned that "[t]his conflict can be resolved only by the
promotion of one rule at the expense of the other."44 Based on its
reading of American Pipe, which the Appleton court concluded implicitly favored rule 23 litigative efficiency and economy over statutes of limitations notice and repose,45 the court held that the statute
of limitations in a defendant class action is tolled for all members of
the purported class when the complaint is filed. 46
TheAppleton court's interpretation ofAmerican Pipe, however, is
incorrect. InAmerican Pipe the Supreme Court indicated no preference for either rule 23 or statutes of limitations. Instead, the court
emphasized that the tolling doctrine it established was consistent
with both the vitality of class actions and the proper function of limitations statutes.47 Because the goals of the class action procedure and
the functioning of the statute of limitations were compatible inAmerican Pipe, the Court did not weigh their relative importance.48 Contrary to theAp_pleton court's assertion,American Pipe and its progeny
have maintained a constant emphasis on furnishing notice to the defendant in plaintiff class actions.49 Thus, the court's discernment of
43. 635 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981).
44. 635 F.2d at 609.
The court observed that due process is not offended by a tolling provision that does not
afford notice to the defendant within the limitations period. Constitutional notions of "fairness" embodied in due process considerations do not require that any defendant, named or
absent, receive notice of suit within some specified limitations period. See generally J)evelop•
ments in the Law- Class Actions, 89 HAR.v. L. REv. 1318, 1405 (1976). The length of the
limitations period and the provisions for co=encing and tolling the running of the statute are
regarded as pragmatic expressions of public policy decisions, not "fundamental" or "natural"
rights of the defendant. Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,314 (1945)rl Therefore,
courts and legislatures may establish and alter limitations periods and tolling rules without
trenching upon any constitutional due process requirements. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S.
620 (1885); Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); cf. Kerney v. Fort Griffin
Fandangle Assn., 624 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (Court rejected contention that defendant
class action was unconstitutional, but suggested that failure of district court to ensure adequate
notice to individual defendant might constitute a denial of due process such that the defendant
''would be entitled to have an adverse judgment set aside or reversed on appeal.").
45. 635 F.2d at 609.
46. 635 F.2d at 609-10.
47. 414 U.S. at 555. ("Since the imposition of a time bar would not in this circumstance
[where adequate information about the suit is given to defendants] promote the purposes of the
statute of limitations, the tolling rule we establish here is consistent both with the procedures of
Rule 23 and with the proper function of the limitations statute.")
48. 414 U.S. at 554.
49. In Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103 S. Ct. 2392 (1983), the Court held that
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an "implicit" preference appears unfounded.
To summarize, the courts that have devised tolling rules for defendant class actions have engaged in a "trade off'' between the policies underlying rule 23 and statutes of limitations.so As
demonstrated below, however, subordination of either policy to the
other has significant, negative costs.
B. Subordination of Litigative Economy to Notice

The Chevalier court held that a statute of limitations should continue to run in favor of each absent defendant until the class was
certified and actual or constructive notice was received.s 1 This approach does eliminate the risk that an unnamed defendant may not
be aware of the suit during the limitations period. Such a tolling
rule, however, would operate unpredictably.s 2 Although the Federal
American Pipe extended to parties filing individual suits as well as intervenors after denial of
class certification. Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence, believing it important to reiterate the views expressed by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence in American Pipe. 103 S. Ct.
at 2397 (Powell, J., concurring). Significantly, Justice Blackmun was the author of the Court's
opinion in Crown. In American Pipe, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Court's tolling
rule would not invariably be extended to intervenors. He cautioned that courts should exercise
discretion in granting permissive intervention to ''preserve a defendant whole against prejudice
arising from claims for which he has received no prior notice." 414 U.S. at 562 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
In Crown, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, returned to this
language inAmerican Pipe, extending its application to absent class members filing individual
suits after denial of certification, as well as intervenors. 103 S. Ct. at 2398 (Powell, J., concurring). Noting that the tolling rule of American Pipe "is a generous one, inviting abuse," and
quoting the language from that opinion that a class suit notifies defendants of the substantive
claims against them and the number and generic identities of potential plaintiffs, Justice Powell concluded, "Claims as to which the defendant was not fairly placed on notice by the class
suit are not protected under American Pipe and are barred by the statute of limitations." 103 S.
Ct. at 2398 (Powell, J., concurring).
Other cases as well have emphasized notice as the key element in extendingAmerican Pipe
to related fact situations. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23
advisory committee note on 1966 amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966)
(quoted at note 26 supra); Note, supra note 15, at 419 ("Basic principles of fairness, however,
constrain the pursuit of judicial efficiency.") & n.90 (''The Advisory Committee Notes are
replete with references to 'measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these
actions.' ").
Interestingly, in prior litigation involving the claims at issue inAppleton, in upholding the
trial judge's certification of a defendant class, the court emphasized that the defendants in fact
had notice of the claims against them:
In reaching this conclusion, he was justified in considering, as we presume he did, that the
carriers were given adequate notice that refunds might ultimately be necessary, that consequently they should have kept and earmarked all necessary documents and records, and
that difficulties and costs resulting from their failure to do so would be at their own risk
and burden.
Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 139 (7th Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
50. Note, The American Pipe Dream: Class Actions and Statutes ofLimitations, 67 loWA L.
REv. 743, 770-71 (1982).
51. 72 F.R.D. at 155.
52. Unpredictability undercuts all the justifications for statutes of limitations. See Special
Project, supra note 20, at 1075-76.
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Rules state that certification is to be determined "as soon as practicable" after a class action is filed, 53 "it may not be possible to decide
even tentatively near the outset of the case whether it should continue as a class action."54 Consequently, a diligent plaintiff could
find a promptly filed claim ultimately barred by the statute of limitations as to unnamed members of the defendant class.55
This uncertainty would generate a strong incentive for plaintiffs
to file separate protective actions against all members of the defendant class or to join all members individually in the suit, thus defeating the purpose of rule 23.56 In fact, such superfluous, protective
filings may be even more likely in defendant than in plaintiff class
actions. In a defendant class action, plaintiffs, by filing a complaint,
have already indicated their awareness of their legal rights and willingness to take some form of legal action. By contrast, not every
absent member of a plaintiff class is aware of the suit and willing to
file a separate action to protect his individual interest.57 Moreover,
commentators have observed that defendant classes, although sufficiently numerous to make joinder or separate suits inconvenient and
difficult,58 tend to be smaller and easier to identify than plaintiff
classes.59 Finally, protective suits may also be more attractive to
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l).
54. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 42
(1967). See also .Developments in the Law- Class Actions,supra note 44, at 1475-79 (difficulties associated with determining identity of class and adequacy of representation before class
certification); Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123,
1141-43 (1974).
55. This result runs counter to the underlying purpose of the Federal Rules. They were
designed to ensure that cases would be heard and decided on their merits, see, e.g., Middle At!.
Utils. Co. v. S.M.W. Dev. Corp., 392 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1968); Century Refining Co. v.
Hall, 316 F.2d 15, 20 (10th Cir. 1963); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 444,
447 (D.D.C. 1977); Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 306 F. Supp. 884, 886 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Holtzoff, Twelve Months Under the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 A.B.A.J. 45, 45 (1940), and are
liberally interpreted to avoid technical procedural problems,see, e.g., Staren v. American Natl.
Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976).
56. See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, 635 F.2d 603, 610 (1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 976 (1981).
57. Obviously, in some cases a plaintiff will not be willing to endure the inconvenience and
expense of suing each defendant class member separately, but it is reasonable to assume that a
plaintiff who has taken some legal action against a class is more likely to pursue his interests
against individuals than a plaintiff who is oblivious to a suit brought in his behalf. q. Miller,
Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 320-22 (1972) (even upon receipt of
individual notice after certification of a (b)(3) class action, many plaintiffs demonstrate little
understanding of or interest in recovering on their cause of action).
58. For example, in United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10 (D,
Nev. 1975), the court observed thatjoinder of the 3,800 members of the defendant class would
involve six to twelve months and considerable expense. 71 F.R.D. at 16. The class must be "so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(I).
59. Parsons & Starr, Environmental Litigation and .Defendant Class Actions: The Unrealized
Viability ofRule 23, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 895 (1975); Note, supra note 34, at 854, 858. The
Appleton litigation is illustrative. It involved "a multi-million member plaintiff class and a
thousand-plus defendant class." Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 497
F.2d 126, 127 (7th Cir. 1974).
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plaintiffs, since individual recoveries tend to be larger in defendant
than in plaintiff class actions.60
Because the risk of duplicative actions is so great in defendant
class actions, it is imperative that a tolling standard be established
which reduces the need for protective suits. Unless a plaintiff can be
assured before the end of the limitations period that the statute is
tolled for all class members, he must either risk losing meritorious
claims or file unnecessary; duplicative motions that, in the Appleton
court's words, ''would sound the death knell for suits brought against
a defendant class, nullifying that part of rule 23 that specifically authorizes such suits."6 1
C. Subordination

ef Notice to Litigative Economy

The importance of ensuring defendants notice has been recognized in the context of plaintiff class actions by American Pipe and its
progeny.62 In American Pipe the Supreme Court scrutinized the
complaint to ascertain whether or not the defendant was afforded
adequate information within the limitations period regarding the
size and subject matter of the suit.63 In subsequent suits addressing
the problem of statutes of limitations in plaintiff class actions, federal
courts have emphasized the need to furnish sufficient information
within the statutory period. Thus, for example, where named representatives' claims were not typical of all class members, tolling was
permitted only to the extent that the complaint provided fair notice
of the character and claims of the total plaintiff class.64 In another
instance, the named representative was not a member of the class
that was finally certified. There the court held that a complaint
brought by an improper plaintiff tolls the statute only if it furnishes
the defendant essential information about the suit. 65
60. See Note, supra note 34, at 854.
61. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, 635 F.2d 603, 610 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981). The Appleton court went on to describe the impact such a result
would have:
This, in tum, would have a potentially devastating effect on the federal courts. Plaintiffs
would, in each case, be required to file protective suits, pending class certification, to stop
the running of the statute of limitations. In the present instance, this could have resulted
in the filing of a staggering number of complaints. As we stated in our decision affirming
the district court's certification of both the plaintiff and defendant classes in the case at
bar, "[t]he unparalleled, obstructive and duplicative efforts by the carriers to avoid paying
refunds that by their nature.should have been more or less automatically returned to
shippers . . . [in] 1971, underscores the basic wisdom of Rule 23." Appleton Electric Co.,
supra, 494 F.2d at 133.
635 F.2d at 610.
62. See note 49 supra and accompanying text
63. 414 U.S. at 554-55.
64. McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
65. Haas v. Pittsburgh Natl. Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975). Other cases emphasizing
the importance of fair notice in applying theAmerican Pipe doctrine include Rose v. Arkansas
Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1191-93 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Stoddard v. Ling-
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Despite the acknowledged importance of providing absent defendants in class actions with notice, the Bestline and Appleton courts
adopted a tolling rule that does not ensure notice within the limitations period. Because process is served only on the named class representatives,66 if the statute is tolled as to the entire class upon mere
filing of a complaint, "[absent] defendants would be required to defend against actions of which they had no knowledge whatsoever
until after the statute of limitations had run." 67 Two arguments,
neither of which are persuasive, have been advanced to justify lack
of notice to absent defendants.
The essence of the first argument is that rule 23 protects absent
defendants' interests primarily through adequate representation,68
rather than notice. The argument goes as follows. Notice in defendant class actions is principally discretionary. It is mandated only for
defendants certified under rule 23(b)(3),69 the least common defendant class.70 In the more usual case, where the class is certified under
rule 23(b)(l) or (2), the court may choose,71 but is not required, 72 to
Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314, 335 (C.D. Cal 1980); Johnson v. Brace, 472 F. Supp.
1056, 1059 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571, 578-80 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
66. See Wolfson, supra note 12, at 469-70.
67. Chevalier v. Baird Sav. Assn., 72 F.R.D. 140, 155 (E.D. Pa. 1976), quoted in Appleton
Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, 635 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 45 I U.S. 976
(1981). Cf. Arnell v. Ramsey, 500 F.2d 774, 782 n.10 (1977) (plaintiff class aclion) ("[N]othing
in American Pipe suggests that the statute be suspended from running in favor of a person not
named as a defendant in the class suit, and we decline so to extend the rule. A different
conclusion would not comport with reason.").
68. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853) (''The legal and equitable
rights and liabilities of all being before the court by representation, and especially where the
subject-matter of the suit is co=on to all, there can be very little danger but that the interest
of all will be properly protected and maintained."); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292
F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968) ("[T]he essential requisite of due process as to absent members of the class is not notice, but adequacy of representation of their interests by named
parties."), modified, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971) & 404 U.S.
1063 (1972); Management Television Systems v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D. 162,
164-65 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (Although absent members did not receive notice, "where a class is
adequately represented, and where there is no conflict of interest between members of a class,
a judgment binding on all the members does not offend due process."); Parsons & Starr, supra
note 59, at 890; Note, supra note 12, at 646. But cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 176 (1974) ("Petitioner further contends that adequate representation, rather than notice,
is the touchstone of due process in a class action and therefore satisfies Rule 23. We think this
view has little to co=end it. To begin with, Rule 23 speaks to notice as-well as to adequacy
of representation and requires that both be provided."); Co=ent, The Importance of Being
Adequate: J)ue Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1217, 1240 (1975) (''Notice should be viewed as a part of, or handmaiden to, adequate
representation. The notice requirement reinforces the requirement of adequate
representation.").
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) ("In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable • • • .'').
70. See notes 12 & 34 supra.
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d){2).
72. The Supreme Court suggested that notice might be more broadly required in Eisen v.
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order notice to absent members. Rule 23(b)(l) and (2) defendants
are protected not by notice, but by the requirement of adequate representation. In all class actions, absent parties are considered the
passive beneficiaries of the named representatives' industry73 and are
bound by the decision. Consequently, adequate representation is
critical to the fair disposition of a class action, 74 and is carefully scrutinized in all defendant class actions.75 Adequate representation, the
argument concludes,76 thus protects all absent members.77
This reasoning, however, is convincing only when adequacy of
representation has been approved, and a homogeneous class certified
for all issues. Limitations problems may arise, though, in other situations. If the class is not certified, unnamed defendants cannot rely
on the named representatives for protection, but require notice
within the limitations period to preserve their defenses. 78 Similarly,
absent defendants who choose to opt out of a (b)(3) class must
mount individual defenses;79 notice of the pendency of the suit
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974), but the next year confirmed that notice was
necessary only in rule 23(b)(3) actions. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 n.4. (1975).
73. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551-52 (1974).
14. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
15. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853) ("In all cases where . . . a
few are permitted to . . . defend on behalf of the many, by representation, care must be taken
that persons are brought on record fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it ,
may be fully and honestly tried."); Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Assn., 97
F.R.D. 668, 679 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("Because of the serious due process problems which attend
the certification of a defendant class, the 23(a)(4) mandate for an adequate representative must'
be strictly observed."); Marston v. L.E. Gant, Ltd., 56 F.R.D. 60, 62 (E.D. Va. 1972) (''The
adequacy of representation should be scrutinized with particular care where suit is brought
against a purported class of defendants, the obvious reason being that they cannot be protected
adequately if the interest of the defendants, or the members of the class, are in conflict.").
The problem of adequate representation is particularly serious in defendant class actions,
since the plaintiff chooses the representative, who may have little incentive to incur the expense of defending the suit. See z. CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 237 (1950) ("It
is a strange situation where one side picks out the generals for the enemy's army."); Kalven &
Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 696 n.39
(1941); see generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 1770.
76. Many courts and commentators, though, have argued that unnamed defendants' inter- ,
ests can be fairly protected only if notice is provided. See Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, 97 F.R.D. 453,459 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (''The Court acknowledges
that a decision adverse to and binding upon defendant class members would pose grave constitutional problems were it not accompanied by notice and opportunity to be heard."); Parsons
& Starr, supra note 59, at 894-95; Comment, supra note 34, at 619; Note, supra note 34, at 85859; Note, supra note 15, at 418-19. But see Note, supra note 12, at 646.
77. Adequate representation cannot, however, spare the defendant who expected repose
after expiration of the limitations period the unwelcome suprise that he is still vulnerable to
suit. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d
522, 525 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Once the statute has run, a potential defendant who has not been
served is enti*d to expect that he will no longer have to defend against the claim. If service
can be delayed indefinitely once the complaint is filed within the statutory period, these expectations are defeated . . . .").
78. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
79. Class members in (b)(3) class actions have an unconditional right to "opt out" and
pursue their claims or present their defenses individually. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
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within the limitations period is essential to protect their interests. 80
Moreover, a court may certify a defendant class only with respect to
certain common issues. 81 Once these issues are resolved with respect
to the class, individual defenses must be presented, 82 which must be
safeguarded by notice, not representation.
The second argument that attempts to justify tolling upon filing a
complaint against a defendant class, despite lack of notice to absent
members, is based on the failure of the Federal Rules to require
service of process within the limitations period. The structure of this
argument is as follows. Rule 3 tolls the statute upon filing a complaint, 83 but rule 4 does not mandate notice within the limitations
period.84 As a result, the normal tolling rule admits the possibility
U.S. 156 (1974), the Supreme Court held that individual notice must be mailed to all members
of a plaintiff class, so that the individual can "preserve his opportunity to press his claim
separately," 417 U.S. at 176, even though in Eisen the class consisted of2,250,000 identifiable
members to whom notice would have cost $225,000, and the named representative's stake in
the potential class recovery was only $70. 417 U.S. at 166-68.
The Court suggested in dictum that the American Pipe tolling rule preserved the right of
absent class members to opt out and file separate suits. 417 U.S. at 176 n.13. Because, however, unlike intervention, opting out would lead to duplicative suits and undermine the goal of
litigative efficiency emphasized in American Pipe, there was subsequent speculation that the
Eisen dictum would not prevail should the question come before the Court. See Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (D.D.C. 1978),
revd. on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Note,
supra note 15; see also Arnell v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1977) (reaching same
conclusion, but not referring to Eisen dictum); Gluck v. Amicor, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 608, 615
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp. 356, 361 (N.D. Ala. 1980)
(same); cf. Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (statute not tolled for separate suit
filed after class certification was denied), vacated and remanded, 103 S.Ct. 3529 (1983); Stull v.
Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
This issue was laid to rest in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103 S. Ct. 2392 (1983).
The Court unanimously agreed that theAmerican Pipe tolling rule extended to purported class
members filing separate suits as well as motions to intervene after denial of class certification,
relying in part in their opinion on the Eisen dictum. 103 S. Ct. at 2396. (Although Justice
Powell wrote a separate concurrence, see note 49 supra, he also joined the Court's opinion.
103 S. Ct. at 2397 (Powell, J., concurring)).
80. Because classes certified under (b)(3) are generally less cohesive than (b)(l) or (2)
classes, there is a greater concern that named representatives of the class may not adequately
protect absent members. See 1A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 1786, at 143.
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (''When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues . . . ."); see, e.g., Research Corp. v.
Pfister Associated Growers, 301 F. Supp. 497, 502 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
82. See Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engrs., 90
F.R.D. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (defendant class decertified after determination ofliability ("Stage
I") for individual "mini-hearings" on damages ("Stage II")). Even if all claims are resolved in
the class dispute, where monetary relief has been granted, judgment operates only as a "declaration of rights and duties concerning common issues" against absent defendants. Wolfson,
supra note 12, at 466. Consequently, when plaintiffs seek to execute judgment, absentees are
entitled to raise individual defenses in opposition. Id.
83. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
84. Such a requirement was included in a preliminary draft of the Federal Rules, but the
Advisory Committee rejected it, and courts have subsequently refused to infer it from rule 3,
See, e.g., Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1956); Badillo v. Central Steel
& Wire Co., 495 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Ill. 1980); FED. R. C1v. P. 3 original committee note
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that a defendant may not receive notice before the statute has run.
According to this rationale, absent defendant class members are
treated the same as individual defendants - neither are guaranteed
service of process within the limitations period. 85
This argument, however, fails to recognize that the risk to individual defendants is mitigated by the provision of rule 486 requiring
that a summons be issued "forthwith" upon filing. 87 A defendant
who is not served within a reasonable time may move to dismiss the
suit for failure to prosecute. 88 Such a motion will be granted if the
court finds a lack of due diligence by the plaintiff. This lack of diligence is determined in large part by the prejudice that the plaintiff's
delay causes the defendant. 89 Where the defendant can show
prejudice, the plaintiff is likely to be found insufficiently diligent. 90
If the delay is extremely long, prejudice may even be presumed. 91
If absent class members were actually treated like named defendants under rule 3, they would therefore be entitled, not only to
of 1937, reprinted in 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 3.01(2] (2d ed.
1983).
85. See Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Assn., 624 F.2d 717, 722 (5th Cir. 1980). The
court in Appleton similarly pointed out that "literal compliance with Rule 3" ordinarily tolled
the statute of limitations, 635 F.2d at 608, but reasoned that Rule 3 did not dispose of the
problem in defendant class actions, 635 F.2d at 609.
86. FED. R. Cxv. P. 4(a) ("Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a
summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who shall be
responsible for the prompt service of the summons and a copy of the complaint.").
87. See Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. Unit B 1980);
Note, supra note 50, at 769; note 84 supra and accompanying text.
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 4l(b). See, e.g., Jordan v. United States, 694 F.2d 833, 837 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328, 329 (2d Cir. 1956); Campbell v. United
States, 496 F. Supp. 36, 39 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); McCrea v. General Motors Corp., 53 F.R.D.
384, 385 (D. Mont. 1971); see generally 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 41.11 (2d ed. 1982).
89. See, e.g., Titus v. Mercedes Benz ofN. Am., 695 F.2d 746, 750-51 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1982);
Citizens Utils. Co. v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979); Messenger v. United States, 231 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1956); Prudential Lines
v. Marine Repair Servs., 94 F.R.D. 325, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Saylor v. Lindsley, 71 F.R.D.
380, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), qffd, 623 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit follows a different rule from other courts and will dismiss for failure to prosecute only in cases of intentional
misconduct. See Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1189 (5th Cir. Unit B
1980).
Without prejudice, the plaintiff's conduct is likely to be excused. See, e.g., Nealey v. Transportaci6n Marltima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1980); Arnesen v. Shawmut
County Bank, N.A., 504 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Mass. 1979); Preston v. Mendlinger, 83 F.R.D. 198
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ahmad v. Independent Order of Foresters, 81 F.R.D. 722 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
qffd, 703 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1983).
90. See, e.g., Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1976); Saylor v. Lindsley,
71 F.R.D. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), qffd, 623 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1980).
91. See, e.g, Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1982); Citizens
Utils. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979); Arundar v. Staff Builders Temporary Personnel, Inc., 92 F.R.D. 770, 771 (N.D. Ga.
1982); Saylor v. Lindsley, 71 F.R.D. 380, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), qffd, 623 F.2d 230 (2d Cir.
1980).
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"forthwith" service of a summons, but to dismissal upon an individualized finding of prejudice from delay. 92 Because of the delays in the certification and notice procedure, 93 if such an approach
were taken to tolling questions in defendant class actions, 94 plaintiffs
once again could not be certain whether any claim would be barred
by the statute of limitations and would be induced to file multiple
suits, or risk losing claims against unnamed parties.
III.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION - INFORMAL NOTICE TO ABSENT
MEMBERS AT THE ONSET OF DEFENDANT CLASS
LITIGATION

The previous Part demonstrated that no court thus far has successfully devised a tolling rule for defendant class actions that is consistent with the policies of both rule 23 and statutes of limitations. It
argued further that there is no persuasive reason for subordinating
one policy to the other, and that to do so would seriously undermine
the goals of the subordinated rule.
This Note proposes that courts require plaintiffs to provide informal notice to absent class members at the outset of defendant class
actions. Coupled with a rule that tolls the statute of limitations as to
all class members upon filing of a complaint, this approach harmonizes the operation of both rule 23 and statutes of limitations in defendant class actions: Absent defendants would receive notice
promptly, and plaintiffs would have no incentive to file protective
suits.95 Authority for such an informal notice requirement can be
92. Cf. Veazey v. Young's Yacht Sales & Serv., 644 F.2d 47S, 478 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)
(intentional misconduct requirement, see note 89 supra, not applied to delay in serving process) (''We view a delay between filing and service as being more likely to result in prejudice
than a delay occurring after service, for in the former situation the defendant is not put on
formal notice and allowed a full opportunity to discover and preserve relevant evidence when
the matter is still relatively fresh and the evidence is intact and available."); Richardson v.
United White Shipping Co., 38 F.R.D. 494, 49S-96 (N.D. Cal. 196S) (same).
93. See note S4 supra and accompanying text
94. This seems to be the approach suggested in dictum in Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Assn., 624 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1980). In Kerney, a plaintiff bringing suit against an association sought to amend his complaint to bring a class action, making the defendants named in
the original complaint class representatives. Because "no named defendants [would] find their
defense of the class to be different from their defense as individuals," the court held that the
running of the statute of limitations did not bar the imposition of the additional role as class
representatives. 624 F.2d at 721. The court also suggested that, since absent defendants could
show prejudice after judgment was entered, it was "premature for defendants to object to a
lack of personal notice and service on the unnamed defendants." 624 F.2d at 721. See note 44
supra.
9S. Cf. Note, supra note SO, at 771. The solution suggested by that Note was use of the
Chevalier rule requiring actual notice, and early filing of suit to allow for certification decision
to be completed and notice of certification to be dispatched before expiration of the statute.
The Note suggests that if the certification process is nevertheless incomplete, eleventh hour
notice could be sent to absentees to toll the statute. If, however, upon certification many defendants opted out, plaintiffs would have little time to take action against numerous parties
before the limitations period expired. Hence, either notice would have to be dispatched nearer
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found in rule 23(d)(2).96
While this approach in some instances might impose a greater
burden on plaintiffs than would an individual suit or a plaintiff class
action,97 informal notice would be significantly less onerous than
serving each member personally, as protective suits would require. 98
Plaintiffs receive substantial benefits from maintaining defendant
class actions; it is not inappropriate to impose these unavoidable expenses upon them.99
CONCLUSION

The policies underlying class actions and statutes of limitations
- litigative efficiency and notice - cannot be reconciled in defendant class actions by literal application or rejection of the tolling rule
in American Pipe. Informal notice to absent class members at the
outset of defendant class litigation can eliminate the trade off between these policies in which the courts have thus far engaged. Such
informal notice is not required by rule 23, but the required procedures, as courts have discovered, do not otherwise offer any satisfactory point for tolling. 100 Consequently, informal notice should be
to the outset of the litigation, or plaintiffs would be put to the choice of filing protective actions
or risking lost claims. Moreover, since the size and complexity of class actions often entail
extended periods to proceed, see generally Miller, supra note 12, it may be difficult to file suit at
an early date. These factors, plus the ad hoc quality of the suggested solution, do not recommend it over the rule proposed in this Note.
96. FED. R. CN. P. 23(d) ("In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court
may make appropriate orders: . . . (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action . . . ."). Cf. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 n.25 (1974) ("[I]n certain situations the
intervenors may raise issues·not presented in the class action complaint and to that extent the
defendants will not have received notice of the nature of the claims against them. . . . [U]nder
Rule 23(d)(3) 'the court may make appropriate orders ... imposing conditions
on ... intervenors.'" (citation omitted)); Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandanglc; Assn., 624 F.2d
717, 721 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[f]he court has the power and the duty to ensure that all defendants
be given adequate notice of the action and an opportunity to present individual defenses if
desired.").
97. Even if this proposal resulted in double notice being required in some cases, the burden
of dispatching such notice would be minimized by two factors. First, under rule 23(d)(2), it is
left to the court's discretion to order an appropriate form of notice. See United States v.
Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 71 F.R.D. 10, 17-18 (D. Nev. 1975). Second, defendant
classes are generally smaller and members more readily identifiable than plaintiff classes. See
note 59 supra and accompanying text.
98. One practitioner estimated that to serve several hundred defendants in the traditional
manner would probably cost more than ten thousand dollars. In contrast, personal service on
five named representatives and notification by mail of the rest would cost less than two hundred dollars. Wolfson, supra note 12, at 469-70.
99. See Note, supra note 34, at 858 & n.110.
100. Co=entators have criticized rule 23's lack of provision for defendant class actions,
suggesting that "the draftsmen of the present rule 23 did not rigorously analyze the functions
and problems of defendants' class actions." I H. NEWBERG, supra note 12, § 1148, at 250; cf.
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 75, at 696 n.39 (discussing original rule 23).
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required for tolling purposes as a means of harmonizing the policies
of Rule 23 and statutes of limitations in defendant class actions.

